ify, to measure their success in this
attempt, and if they have not been wholly successful, to point out why
and in what respect they have failed. In a study preliminary to the
present one, I have attempted to apply the rules of mythological science
to the limited area of the native American race; in the present chapter
I shall deal mainly with the philosophy of mythology.
The objection may be urged at starting that there is no such unity of
form in myths as the philosophy of mythology assumes; that if it
appears, it is always explainable historically.
A little investigation sets this objection aside. Certain features must
be common to all myths. A divinity must appear in them and his doings
with men must be recorded. A reasonable being can hardly think at all
without asking himself, "Whence come I, my fellows, and these things
which I see? And what will become of us all?" So some myth is sure to be
created at an early stage of thought which the parent can tell the
child, the wise man his disciple, containing responses to such
questions.
But this reasoning from probability is needless, for the similarity of
mythical tales in very distant nations, where no hypothesis of ancient
intercourse is justified, is one of the best ascertained and most
striking discoveries of modern mythological investigation.[159-1] The
general character of "solar myths" is familiar to most readers, and the
persistency with which they have been applied to the explanation of
generally received historical facts, as well as to the familiar fairy
tales of childhood, has been pushed so far as to become the subject of
satire and caricature. The myths of the Dawn have been so frequently
brought to public notice in the popular writings of Professor Max
Mueller, that their general distribution may be taken as well known. The
same may be said of the storm myths. Wilhelm von Humboldt, who thought
deeply on the religious nature of man, said early in this century:
"Wholly similar myths can very readily arise in different localities,
each independent of the others."[160-1]
This similarity is in a measure owing to the similar impressions which
the same phenomenon, the sunrise or the thunder-storm for instance,
makes on the mind--and to this extent the science of mythology is
adequate to its explanation. But that it falls short is so generally
acknowledged, that various other explanations have been offered.
These may be classed as the skeptical explana
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