every important operation of
the will, we should discern its presence or absence separately in each; and
even though we never had the conception of more than one insulated action,
we should be able to pronounce upon its character. This, however, we have
plainly no power to do. Every moral judgment is relative, and involves a
comparison of two terms. When we praise what _has been_ done, it is with
the coexistent conception of something _else_ that _might have been_ done;
and when we resolve on a course as right, it is to the exclusion of some
other that is wrong. This fact, that every ethical decision is in truth a
_preference_, an election of one act as higher than another, appears of
fundamental importance in the analysis of the moral sentiments."

From this point of view it is plain how trifling are arguments drawn from
the acts of a savage, since an action highly immoral in us might be one
exceedingly virtuous in him--being the highest presented to his choice in
his degraded intellectual condition and peculiar circumstances.

It need only be contended, then, that there _is_ a perception of "right"
incapable of further analysis; not that there is any infallible internal
guide as to all the complex actions which present themselves for {201}
choice. The _principle_ is given in our nature, the _application_ of the
principle is the result of a thousand educational influences.

It is no wonder, then, that, in complex "cases of conscience," it is
sometimes a matter of exceeding difficulty to determine which of two
courses of action is the less objectionable. This no more invalidates the
truth of moral principles than does the difficulty of a mathematical
problem cast doubt on mathematical principles. Habit, education, and
intellectual gifts facilitate the correct application of both.

Again, if our moral insight is intensified or blunted by our habitual
wishes or, indirectly, by our physical condition, the same may be said of
our perception of the true relations of physical facts one to another. An
eager wish for marriage has led many a man to exaggerate the powers of a
limited income, and a fit of dyspepsia has given an unreasonably gloomy
aspect to more than one balance-sheet.

Considering that moral intuitions have to do with _insensible_ matters,
they cannot be expected to be more clear than the perception of physical
facts. And if the latter perceptions may be influenced by volition, desire,
or health, our mora