d will, as these transcend mechanical motion?"

"It is true we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of
being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather
the reverse." "May we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to the
'ultimate cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such
attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not
elevations but degradations?" The way however to arrive at the object aimed
at (_i.e_. to obtain the best attainable conception of the First Cause) is
not to refrain from _the only conceptions possible to us_, but to seek the
very highest of these, and then declare their utter inadequacy; and this is
precisely the course which has been pursued by theologians. It is to be
regretted that before writing on this matter Mr. Spencer did not more
thoroughly acquaint himself with the ordinary doctrine on the subject. It
is always taught in the Church schools of divinity, that nothing, not even
_existence_, is to be predicated _univocally_ of "God" and "creatures;"
that after exhausting ingenuity to arrive at the loftiest possible
conceptions, we must declare them to be _utterly inadequate_; that, after
all, they are but accommodations to human infirmity; that they are in a
sense objectively false (because of their inadequacy), though subjectively
and very practically true. But the difference between this mode of
treatment and that adopted by Mr. Spencer is wide indeed; for the practical
result of the mode inculcated by the Church is that each one may freely
affirm and act upon the highest human conceptions he can attain of the{249}
power, wisdom, and goodness of God, His watchful care, His loving
providence for every man, at every moment and in every need; for the
Christian knows that the falseness of his conceptions lies only in their
_inadequacy_; he may therefore strengthen and refresh himself, may rejoice
and revel in conceptions of the goodness of God, drawn from the tenderest
human images of fatherly care and love, or he may chasten and abase himself
by consideration of the awful holiness and unapproachable majesty of the
Divinity derived from analogous sources, knowing that no thought of man can
ever be _true enough_, can ever attain the incomprehensible reality, which
nevertheless really _is_ all that can be conceived, _plus_ an inconceivable
infinity beyond.

A good illustration of what is here meant, and of the difference betw