they all
like one another?" continued Aristippus. "Not in the least," answered
Socrates, "for they are very different from one another." "And how is it
possible that two beautiful things should be contrary one to the other?"
"This," said Socrates, "is seen every day in men: a beautiful make and
disposition of body for running is very different from a beautiful make
and disposition for wrestling: the excellence and beauty of a buckler is
to cover well him that wears it. On the contrary, the excellence and
beauty of a dart is to be light and piercing." "You answer me," said
Aristippus, "as you answered me before, when I asked you whether you knew
any good thing." "And do you think," replied Socrates, "that the good
and the beautiful are different? Know you not that the things that are
beautiful are good likewise in the same sense? It would be false to say
of virtue that in certain occasions it is beautiful, and in others good.
When we speak of men of honour we join the two qualities, and call them
excellent and good. In our bodies beauty and goodness relate always to
the same end. In a word, all things that are of any use in the world are
esteemed beautiful and good, with regard to the subject for which they
are proper." "At this rate you might find beauty in a basket to carry
dung," said Aristippus. "Yes, if it be well made for that use," answered
Socrates; "and, on the contrary, I would say that a buckler of gold was
ugly if it was ill-made." "Would you say," pursued Aristippus, "that the
same thing may be beautiful and ugly at once?" "I would say that it
might be good and bad. Often what is good for hunger is bad for a fever;
and what is good for a fever is very bad for hunger; often what is
beautiful to be done in running is ugly to be done in wrestling; and what
is beautiful to do in wrestling is ugly in running. For all things are
reputed beautiful and good when they are compared with those which they
suit or become, as they are esteemed ugly and bad when compared with
those they do not become."

Thus we see that when Socrates said that beautiful houses were the most
convenient, he taught plainly enough in what manner we ought to build
them, and he reasoned thus: "Ought not he who builds a house to study
chiefly how to make it most pleasant and most convenient?" This
proposition being granted, he pursued: "Is it not a pleasure to have a
house that is cool in summer and warm in winter? And does not t