And do you believe," said Socrates,
"that it is in the power of a man to know everything?" "Not so much as
even the hundredth part." "It is, then, impossible," said Socrates, "to
find a man who is wise in all things?" "Indeed it is," said Euthydemus.
"It follows, then," said Socrates, "that every man is wise in what he
knows?" "I believe so."
"But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of
good?" "As how?" said Euthydemus. "Do you think," said Socrates, "that
the same thing is profitable to all men?" "By no means." "Do you
believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to
another?" "I think it may." "Then is it not the good that is
profitable?" "Yes, certainly." "Therefore, 'what is profitable is a
good to him to whom it is profitable.'" "That is true."
"Is it not the same with what is beautiful? For, can you say that a body
or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?" "By no means."
"You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for
which it is proper?" "Yes." "But tell me whether what is reputed
beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to
which it is proper?" "No." "Then 'whatever is of any use is reputed
beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?'" "I think
so."
"And what say you of courage?" added Socrates. "Is it an excellent
thing?" "Very excellent," answered Euthydemus. "But do you believe it
to be of use in occasions of little moment?" "Yes; but it is necessary
in great affairs." "Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,"
continued Socrates, "not to perceive the peril we are in?" "I am not of
that opinion." "At that rate," said Socrates, "they who are not
frightened because they see not the danger are in nowise valiant." "There
is no doubt of it," said Euthydemus, "for otherwise there would be some
fools, and even cowards, who must be accounted brave." "And what are
they who fear what is not to be feared?" "They are less brave than the
others," answered Euthydemus. "They therefore," said Socrates, "who show
themselves valiant in dangerous occasions, are they whom you call brave;
and they who behave themselves in them unworthily, are they whom you call
cowards?" "Very right." "Do you think," added Socrates, "that any men
are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave
themselves in them?" "I do not think there are." "And are not they, who
be
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