evere check
would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's further advance
to the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of such a force as
the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lake
being lost? It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if the
detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.

Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way; and it was
from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of their
mobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and battery
of the _Inflexible_; but a good look-out was kept, and the British
squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows. It
may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed,
erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led him
to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner. The British
anchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9]
Islands. Getting under way next morning, they stood up the Lake with
a strong north-east wind, keeping along Grand Island, upon which their
attention doubtless was fastened by the intelligence which they had
received; but it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward with
a fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands. The consequence
was that the American flotilla was not discovered until Valcour
Island, which is from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty
feet high throughout its two miles of length, was so far passed that
the attack had to be made from the south,--from leeward.

When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in command,
Waterbury, urged that in view of the enemy's superiority the flotilla
should get under way at once, and fight them "on a retreat in the main
lake;" the harbour being disadvantageous "to fight a number so much
superior, and the enemy being able to surround us on every side, we
lying between an island and the main." Waterbury's advice evidently
found its origin in that fruitful source of military errors of design,
which reckons the preservation of a force first of objects, making the
results of its action secondary. With sounder judgment, Arnold decided
to hold on. A retreat before square-rigged sailing vessels having a
fair wind, by a heterogeneous force like his own, of unequal speeds
and batteries, could result only in disaster. Concerted fire and
successful escape were alike improbable; and besides, escape, if
feasible, was but th