from the Czar, than that amounting only to
sixty odd thousand pounds (whereof, by the way, two parts in three may
perhaps be disputable), which provoked us first to send twenty
men-of-war in the Baltic with order to attack the Swedes wherever they
met them? And yet, did not this very Czar, this very aspiring and
dangerous prince, _last summer command the whole confederate fleet_, as
it was called, _of which our men-of-war made the most considerable part?
The first instance that ever was of a Foreign Potentate having the
command given him of the English fleet, the bulwark of our nation_; and
did not our said men-of-war afterwards convey his (the Czar's) transport
ships and troops on board of them, in their return from Zealand,
_protecting them from the Swedish fleet_, which else would have made a
considerable havoc amongst them?

"_Query XIII._ Suppose now, we had, on the contrary, taken hold of the
great and many complaints our merchants have made of the ill-usage they
meet from the Czar, to have sent our fleet to show our resentment
against that prince, to prevent his great and pernicious designs even to
us, _to assist Sweden pursuant to this Treaty_, and effectually to
restore the peace in the North, would not that have been more for our
interest, more necessary, more honourable and just, and more according
to our Treaty; and would not the several 100,000 pounds these our
Northern expeditions have cost the nation, have been thus better
employed?

"_Query XIV._ If the preserving and securing our trade against the
Swedes has been the only and real object of all our measures, as to the
Northern affairs, how came we the year before the last to leave eight
men-of-war in the Baltic and at Copenhagen, when we had no more trade
there to protect, and how came Admiral Norris last summer, although he
and the Dutch together made up the number of twenty-six men-of-war, and
consequently were too strong for the Swedes, to attempt anything against
our trade under their convoy; yet to lay above two whole months of the
best season in the Sound, without convoying our and the Dutch
merchantmen to the several ports they were bound for, whereby they were
kept in the Baltic so late that their return could not but be very
hazardous, as it even proved, both to them and our men-of-war
themselves? Will not the world be apt to think that the hopes of forcing
the King of Sweden to an inglorious and disadvantageous peace, by which
the Duchies of