we have lost by not curbing, when
it was more easy, the growth of the Muscovite power." A middle course
may be thought more convenient.

"If we should find it consistent with the welfare of our State that
the Muscovite have an inlet into the Baltic, as having, of all the
princes of Europe, a country that can be made most beneficial to
its prince, by uttering its produce to foreign markets. In this
case, it were but reasonable to expect, on the other hand, that in
return for our complying so far with his interest, for the
improvement of his country, his Czarish Majesty, on his part,
should demand nothing that may tend to the disturbance of another;
and, therefore, contenting himself with ships of trade, should
demand none of war."

"We should thus preclude his hopes of being ever more than an
inland Power," but "obviate every objection of using the Czar worse
than any Sovereign Prince may expect. I shall not for this give an
instance of a Republic of Genoa, or another in the Baltic itself,
of the Duke of Courland; but will assign Poland and Prussia, who,
though both now crowned heads, have ever contented themselves with
the freedom of an open traffic, without insisting on a fleet. Or
the treaty of Falczin, between the Turk and Muscovite, by which
Peter was forced not only to restore Asoph, and to part with all
his men-of-war in those parts, but also to content himself with the
bare freedom of traffic in the Black Sea. Even an inlet in the
Baltic for trade is much beyond what he could morally have promised
himself not yet so long ago on the issue of his war with Sweden."

If the Czar refuse to agree to such "a healing temperament," we shall
have "nothing to regret but the time we lost to exert all the means that
Heaven has made us master of, to reduce him to a peace advantageous to
Great Britain." War would become inevitable. In that case

"it ought no less to animate our Ministry to pursue their present
measures, than fire with indignation the breast of every honest
Briton that a Czar of Muscovy, who owes his naval skill to our
instructions, and his grandeur to our forbearance, should so soon
deny to Great Britain the terms which so few years ago he was fain
to take up with from the Sublime Porte."

"'Tis every way our interest to have the Swede restored to those