the same people he had refused a soul fifteen minutes
earlier.

[3] The edition I believe to be original reads "put them off" in
place of "caught them."

Finally Micromegas said to them, "Since you know what is exterior to
you so well, you must know what is interior even better. Tell me what
your soul is, and how you form ideas." The philosophers spoke all at
once as before, but they were of different views. The oldest cited
Aristotle, another pronounced the name of Descartes; this one here,
Malebranche; another Leibnitz; another Locke. An old peripatetic
spoke up with confidence: "The soul is an entelechy, and a reason
gives it the power to be what it is." This is what Aristotle
expressly declares, page 633 of the Louvre edition. He cited the
passage[4].

[4] Here is the passage such as it is transcribed in the edition
dated 1750: "Entele'xeia' tis esi kai' lo'gos tou dy'namin
e'xontos toude' ei'nai."

This passage of Aristotle, _On the Soul_, book II, chapter II, is
translated thusly by Casaubon: _Anima quaedam perfectio et actus
ac ratio est quod potentiam habet ut ejusmodi sit_. B.

"I do not understand Greek very well," said the giant.

"Neither do I," said the philosophical mite.

"Why then," the Sirian retorted, "are you citing some man named
Aristotle in the Greek?"

"Because," replied the savant, "one should always cite what one does
not understand at all in the language one understands the least."

The Cartesian took the floor and said: "The soul is a pure spirit
that has received in the belly of its mother all metaphysical ideas,
and which, leaving that place, is obliged to go to school, and to
learn all over again what it already knew, and will not know again."

"It is not worth the trouble," responded the animal with the height
of eight leagues, "for your soul to be so knowledgeable in its
mother's stomach, only to be so ignorant when you have hair on your
chin. But what do you understand by the mind?"

"You are asking me?" said the reasoner. "I have no idea. We say that
it is not matter--"

"But do you at least know what matter is?"

"Certainly," replied the man. "For example this stone is grey, has
such and such a form, has three dimensions, is heavy and divisible."

"Well!" said the Sirian, "this thing that appears to you to be
divisible, heavy, and grey, will you tell me what it is? You see some
attributes, but behind those, are you familiar with that?

"No," said the other.