ed infantry was being raised
at Maritzburg by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers,
and another at Durban by Lieut.-Colonel Bethune, 16th Lancers.

[Footnote 180: See Chapter X.]

[Sidenote: Threatened siege changes situation.]

The result of the battle of 30th October made it probable that the
field force at Ladysmith would be soon cut off from its
communications. To keep the road open to the south, Sir George White
that evening reinforced the garrison of Colenso by despatching thither
by rail from Ladysmith the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a company of
mounted infantry, and the Natal Field battery, whose obsolete
7-pounder guns had been grievously outranged at Elandslaagte. On
arrival at Colenso, the commanding officer of the Dublin, Colonel C.
D. Cooper, assumed command of that post, finding there one squadron of
the Natal Carbineers, one squadron Imperial Light Horse, a party of
mounted Police, and the Durban Light Infantry (about 380 strong), and
a detachment (fifty strong) of the Natal Naval Volunteers, with two
9-pounder guns. The total strength of the command, including the
reinforcements from Ladysmith, was approximately 1,200 men. The Natal
Royal Rifles (150 strong) were encamped at Estcourt, twenty-five miles
in rear.

[Sidenote: An anxious fortnight, Oct. 31st-Nov. 14th.]

On the following day General White telegraphed to the Governor of the
colony: "My intention is to hold Ladysmith, make attacks on the
enemy's position whenever possible, and retain the greatest number of
the enemy here." Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson and the officer commanding the
Natal line of communication, Brigadier-General J. S. Wolfe Murray,
were thus confronted with a difficult and anxious situation. It was
obvious that, having regard to the numerical superiority and greater
mobility of the enemy, the British force at Ladysmith would, in all
probability, be unable to retain the whole of the Boer army. A raid on
southern Natal was therefore to be expected immediately, and the
strength of that raid might well be such as to overwhelm, or, at any
rate, to ignore, the weak garrisons which so imperfectly covered
Maritzburg and Durban. Moreover, General Murray was aware that even if
Sir R. Buller should think fit to divert from Cape Colony any portion
of the expeditionary force now on the high seas, a fortnight must
elapse before a single man could be landed at Durban.

[Sidenote: Provisional steps in case of Boer raid