o some carelessness had not been forwarded by the telegraph
clerk. The precaution of demanding an acknowledgment of the receipt of
this important order, or of sending a duplicate, does not appear to
have been taken by the divisional staff.

[Sidenote: Arrangements for feeding men.]

The troops had dined before leaving Putterskraal, and took with them
one and a half day's rations, the half ration to be eaten in the train
on the way to Molteno, and the remainder to be carried by the men on
the march. The preserved meat had been issued in 6lb. tins. These were
very inconvenient. Therefore many of them were thrown away.

[Sidenote: Dec. 9th, 1899. Orders for night march issues. Lack of
maps.]

On arriving at Molteno, Sir W. Gatacre assembled the commanding
officers and issued personally to them his orders for the movement
against Stormberg. His Intelligence staff had ascertained that the
actual strength of the Boers in laager at that moment was about 1,700,
and that the southern face of the Kissieberg and the Nek between that
hill and Rooi Kop were entrenched. The General, on receipt of this
information, determined to modify his original plan. Although
Stormberg had been occupied for more than a month by British troops,
no systematic sketching of the surrounding country had been
undertaken. Except a plan made more than a year before of the ground
in the immediate neighbourhood of the junction, and reproduced in one
of the Intelligence handbooks, the only map at the disposal of the
Staff was the Cape Survey, the scale of which, 12-1/2 miles to an
inch, was too small for tactical purposes.

[Sidenote: The method of march.]

The local Cape Police, the Berkshire mounted infantry, and others were
very well acquainted with the country; and, after a personal
examination of Sergeant Morgan, Cape Police, and several native
policemen, who had previously been selected as guides, Sir W. Gatacre
determined to move his force out from Molteno by the Steynsburg road,
and to diverge from that road by a cross track, leading northwards
from a point near D. Foster's farm to Van Zyl's farm,[193] which was
situated immediately in rear of the western face of the Kissieberg.
Thus the position on the Nek would be turned. The distance to be
covered during this flank march was said by his informants to be about
nine miles. The actual distance was about ten miles. Allowing for
intermediate rests for the men, the General anticipated that he woul