stry and physics the laws and
general principles are based on substances, experiments, and processes
observable by the senses. Grammar and language, when studied as a
science, advance from concept to concept through etymology and syntax.
In geography and history the concepts are less definite and more
difficult to formulate, and yet there are many typical ideas which are
to be developed and illustrated in each of these studies; in history,
for example, colony, legislature, governor, general, revolution,
institutions and customs, political party, laws of development, causal
relations, inventions, etc.; in geography, continents, oceans, forms of
relief, kinds of climate and causes, occupations, products, commerce,
etc. The fundamental truths and relations and rules of arithmetic must
be developed from objects and illustrations. Reading, spelling, and
writing are arts, not sciences, and are more concerned with skill in
execution than with the acquisition of a body of scientific truths.
And yet certain general truths are emphasized and applied in these
studies.

Much needless confusion has been caused by raising the question _where
to begin_ in learning. Do we proceed from the whole, to the parts, or
from the parts to the whole? In making the acquaintance of sense
objects it seems clear that we first perceive wholes (somewhat vaguely
and indefinitely). The second impulse is to analyze this whole into
its parts, then recombine them (synthesis) into a whole which is more
definitely and fully grasped. A house, for example, is generally first
perceived as a whole; and later it is examined more particularly as to
its materials, rooms, stairways, conveniences, furnishings, etc. The
same is true with a mountain, a butterfly, a man. Thus far we have
proceeded from the whole to the parts and then back again; analysis and
synthesis. The next movement is from this whole or object toward a
group of similar objects, a class notion. By comparing one thing with
others similar, a class notion is formed which includes them all. Each
individual is a whole, but is also a type of the entire group. The
general mental movement is successively in two directions from any
particular object; first, from the whole to the parts, then grasping
this whole in a richer, fuller sense, the mind seeks for relations
which bind this object with others similar into a group, a more complex
product, a concept. There may appear to be an exception to