been established, the causes that bred
it were in their turn intensified by its reaction, and the evil round
was complete. To make matters worse, the struggle for wealth,
stimulated by the marvellous richness of a part of the country,
claimed the attention of thousands to the exclusion of politics, and
those who would naturally have led in affairs of State adopted the
evil philosophy that it is cheaper to be robbed by professional
politicians than to neglect private business for the sake of public
duty.
Having sought thus to trace the steps by which our form of administration
has begotten the spoils system, let us endeavor to prove the conclusion
by another process of reasoning. Were our government a parliamentary
system, such as exists among the free peoples of the Old World, we
should have a legislature promptly responsive to movements of the popular
will, a ministry sitting in one or the other house of Congress, and
dependent for continuance in power upon the support of a majority in the
Lower House, and an executive disarmed in whole or in part of the power
to negative legislative enactments. The result would be to concentrate
interest not as now upon the election of a president whose chief
function is to distribute places, and whose part in legislation is
almost purely negative, but upon the choice of the legislative body whose
majority should determine the political complexion of the president's
advisers and the general policy of the administration. At each general
election for members of the Lower House the issue would be some
well-defined question then under hot discussion, and in most instances
Congress would have been dissolved for the express purpose of taking the
sense of the people upon the matter at issue. Public interest in
political discussion would return, because great principles, such as
have an important bearing upon the lives of all men, would be under
debate, and the mass of voters would have such an incentive to activity
as the shadowy hope of place could never furnish. The knowledge that
the popular will would find prompt expression through the law-making
power would render it impossible for the people to be turned from their
purpose by the jugglery of place-hunters.
With a whole people interested in political discussion no conceivable
abuse of patronage could balk them of their will, and the spoils
system would disappear because the factitious importance of
office-holders and office-seekers
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