g can be a financial success unless it is given time to
develop properly.

With regard to its relation with the Banque d'Escompte et de Prets, the
Russian Bank--believed by some to be a dangerous rival--matters may to my
mind be seen in two aspects. I believe that the Russian Bank, far from
damaging the Imperial Bank, has really been a godsend to it, as it has
relieved it by sharing advances to the Government which in time might
have proved somewhat of a burden on one establishment. It is a mistake,
too, to believe that in a country like Persia there is not room for two
large concerns like the two above-mentioned Banks, and that one or the
other is bound to go.

The rumoured enormous successes of the Russian Bank and its really
fast-increasing prestige are indisputable, but the secret of these things
is well known to the local management of the Imperial Bank, which could
easily follow suit and quickly surpass the Russians if more official and
political support were forthcoming.

The action of the London Stock Exchange in depreciating everything
Persian, for the sake of reprisal, is also injurious to the Bank, and
more so to the prestige of this country, though we do not seem to see
that our attitude has done much more harm to ourselves than to the
Persians. It is true that Persia is a maladministered country, that there
is corruption, that there is intrigue, and so forth, but is there any
other country, may I ask, where to a greater or smaller extent the same
accusation could not be made? Nor can we get away from the fact that
although Persia has been discredited on the London market it is one of
the few countries in which the national debt is extremely small and can
easily be met.

The obligations of the Imperial Government and of Muzaffer-ed-din Shah's
signature, have never failed to be met, nor has the payment of full
interest on mortgages contracted ever been withheld. Delays may have
occurred, but everything has come right in the end. Our absurd attitude
towards the Persians, when we are at the same time ready to back up
enterprises that certainly do not afford one-tenth of the security to be
found in Persia, is therefore rather difficult to understand.

There are few countries in which so much can be done with a comparatively
small outlay as in Persia. It is not enterprises on a gigantic scale, nor
millions of pounds sterling that are needed; moderate sums handled with
judgment, knowledge and patient persever