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s of the characters of things perceived. Accordingly to affirm that the cook is a certain dance of molecules and electrons is merely to affirm that the things about her which are perceivable have certain characters. The situations of the perceived manifestations of her bodily presence have only a very general relation to the situations of the molecules, to be determined by discussion of the circumstances of perception. In discussing the relations of situation in particular and of ingression in general, the first requisite is to note that objects are of radically different types. For each type 'situation' and 'ingression' have their own special meanings which are different from their meanings for other types, though connexions can be pointed out. It is necessary therefore in discussing them to determine what type of objects are under consideration. There are, I think, an indefinite number of types of objects. Happily we need not think of them all. The idea of situation has its peculiar importance in reference to three types of objects which I call sense-objects, perceptual objects and scientific objects. The suitability of these names for the three types is of minor importance, so long as I can succeed in explaining what I mean by them. These three types form an ascending hierarchy, of which each member presupposes the type below. The base of the hierarchy is formed by the sense-objects. These objects do not presuppose any other type of objects. A sense-object is a factor of nature posited by sense-awareness which (i), in that it is an object, does not share in the passage of nature and (ii) is not a relation between other factors of nature. It will of course be a relatum in relations which also implicate other factors of nature. But it is always a relatum and never the relation itself. Examples of sense-objects are a particular sort of colour, say Cambridge blue, or a particular sort of sound, or a particular sort of smell, or a particular sort of feeling. I am not talking of a particular patch of blue as seen during a particular second of time at a definite date. Such a patch is an event where Cambridge blue is situated. Similarly I am not talking of any particular concert-room as filled with the note. I mean the note itself and not the patch of volume filled by the sound for a tenth of a second. It is natural for us to think of the note in itself, but in the case of colour we are apt to think of it merely as a prop
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