ussion of such
factors may be described as being to make obvious things look odd. We
cannot envisage them unless we manage to invest them with some of the
freshness which is due to strangeness.
It is because of this habit of letting constant factors slip from
consciousness that we constantly fall into the error of thinking of the
sense-awareness of a particular factor in nature as being a two-termed
relation between the mind and the factor. For example, I perceive a
green leaf. Language in this statement suppresses all reference to any
factors other than the percipient mind and the green leaf and the
relation of sense-awareness. It discards the obvious inevitable factors
which are essential elements in the perception. I am here, the leaf is
there; and the event here and the event which is the life of the leaf
there are both embedded in a totality of nature which is now, and within
this totality there are other discriminated factors which it is
irrelevant to mention. Thus language habitually sets before the mind a
misleading abstract of the indefinite complexity of the fact of
sense-awareness.
What I now want to discuss is the special relation of the percipient
event which is 'here' to the duration which is 'now.' This relation is a
fact in nature, namely the mind is aware of nature as being with these
two factors in this relation.
Within the short present duration the 'here' of the percipient event has
a definite meaning of some sort. This meaning of 'here' is the content
of the special relation of the percipient event to its associated
duration. I will call this relation 'cogredience.' Accordingly I ask for
a description of the character of the relation of cogredience. The
present snaps into a past and a present when the 'here' of cogredience
loses its single determinate meaning. There has been a passage of nature
from the 'here' of perception within the past duration to the different
'here' of perception within the present duration. But the two 'heres' of
sense-awareness within neighbouring durations may be indistinguishable.
In this case there has been a passage from the past to the present, but
a more retentive perceptive force might have retained the passing nature
as one complete present instead of letting the earlier duration slip
into the past. Namely, the sense of rest helps the integration of
durations into a prolonged present, and the sense of motion
differentiates nature into a succession of shortened
|