dispositions. And from thence they infer that if a man ought to advance
the welfare and comfort of the rest of mankind, there being no virtue
more proper and peculiar to our nature, than to ease the miseries of
others, to free from trouble and anxiety, in furnishing them with the
comforts of life, in which pleasure consists, Nature much more
vigorously leads them to do all this for himself. A life of pleasure is
either a real evil, and in that case we ought not to assist others in
their pursuit of it, but on the contrary, to keep them from it all we
can, as from that which is most hurtful and deadly; or if it is a good
thing, so that we not only may, but ought to help others to it, why then
ought not a man to begin with himself? Since no man can be more bound to
look after the good of another than after his own; for Nature cannot
direct us to be good and kind to others, and yet at the same time to be
unmerciful and cruel to ourselves. Thus, as they define virtue to be
living according to Nature, so they imagine that Nature prompts all
people on to seek after pleasure, as the end of all they do. They also
observe that in order to our supporting the pleasures of life, Nature
inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much raised
above the rest of mankind as to be the only favourite of Nature, who, on
the contrary, seems to have placed on a level all those that belong to
the same species. Upon this they infer that no man ought to seek his own
conveniences so eagerly as to prejudice others; and therefore they think
that not only all agreements between private persons ought to be
observed; but likewise that all those laws ought to be kept, which
either a good prince has published in due form, or to which a people,
that is neither oppressed with tyranny nor circumvented by fraud, has
consented, for distributing those conveniences of life which afford us
all our pleasures.

They think it is an evidence of true wisdom for a man to pursue his own
advantages, as far as the laws allow it. They account it piety to prefer
the public good to one's private concerns; but they think it unjust for
a man to seek for pleasure, by snatching another man's pleasures from
him. And on the contrary, they think it a sign of a gentle and good
soul, for a man to dispense with his own advantage for the good of
others; and that by this means a good man finds as much pleasure one
way, as he parts with another; for as he may expect the li