soudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in
aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered
curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were
coordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing
and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the
rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General Petain
placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and
we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their
veteran experience.
[Sidenote: Questions of communication and supply.]
The eventual place the American Army should take on the western front
was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication
and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British
Armies' shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise
at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and
these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system
behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us
as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of
northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new
construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots and regulating
stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered
us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years
enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.
[Sidenote: Plans for construction on a vast scale.]
With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making
plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover,
broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would
bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the
nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for
material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three
and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of
shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a
correspondingly large project for additional railways and for storage
depots.
[Sidenote: The southern ports are selected.]
All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we
were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the
war we must utilise the southern ports of France--B
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