est any right to hold either province against its
will (which could be ascertained by plebiscite), but because the honors
of war as between France and Germany would then be easy, France having
regained her laurels and taught Germany to respect her, without
obliterating the record of Germany's triumph in 1870. And if the war
should further result in the political reconstruction of the German
Empire as a democratic Commonwealth, and the conquest by the English
people of democratic control of English foreign policy, the combination
would be immensely eased and strengthened, besides being brought into
harmony with American public feeling, which is important to the security
and prestige of the League.

*The Case of the Smaller States.*

Already the war has greatly added to the value of one of the factors
upon which the League of Peace will depend. The smaller States: Holland,
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian Powers, would have joined it
any time these 40 years, had it existed, for the sake of its protection,
and thereby made the Protestant north of Mr. Houston Chamberlain's dream
as much a reality as any such dream is ever likely to be. But after the
fight put up by Belgium the other day, the small States will be able to
come in with the certainty of being treated with considerable respect as
military factors; for Belgium can now claim to have saved Europe
single-handed. Germany has been very unpleasantly reminded of the fact
that though a big man may be able to beat a little one, yet if the
little one fights for all he is worth he may leave the victor very sorry
he broke the peace. Even as between the big Powers, victory has not, as
far as the fighting has yet gone, been always with the biggest
battalions. With a couple of millions less men, the Kaiser might have
taken more care of them and made a better job of it.

At the same time I hold no brief for small States as such, and most
vehemently deny that we are in any way bound to knight errantry on their
behalf as against big ones. They are mostly either incorrigibly
bellicose themselves, like Montenegro, or standing temptations to the
big Powers, like Bosnia and Herzegovina. They multiply frontiers, which
are nuisances, and languages, which have made confusion since the
building of Babel. The striking contrast between the United States of
North America and the disunited States of South America in this respect
is, from the Pacifist point of view, very much in