ample resources for every emergency, and we may be quite sure that
our citizens in no future exigency will be unwilling to supply the
Government with all the means asked for the defense of the country.
In time of peace there can, at all events, be no justification for the
creation of a permanent debt by the Federal Government. Its limited
range of constitutional duties may certainly under such circumstances be
performed without such a resort. It has, it is seen, been avoided during
four years of greater fiscal difficulties than have existed in a similar
period since the adoption of the Constitution, and one also remarkable
for the occurrence of extraordinary causes of expenditures.

But to accomplish so desirable an object two things are indispensable:
First, that the action of the Federal Government be kept within
the boundaries prescribed by its founders, and, secondly, that all
appropriations for objects admitted to be constitutional, and the
expenditure of them also, be subjected to a standard of rigid but
well-considered and practical economy. The first depends chiefly on
the people themselves--the opinions they form of the true construction
of the Constitution and the confidence they repose in the political
sentiments of those they select as their representatives in the Federal
Legislature; the second rests upon the fidelity with which their more
immediate representatives and other public functionaries discharge the
trusts committed to them. The duty of economizing the expenses of the
public service is admitted on all hands; yet there are few subjects upon
which there exists a wider difference of opinion than is constantly
manifested in regard to the fidelity with which that duty is discharged.
Neither diversity of sentiment nor even mutual recriminations upon a
point in respect to which the public mind is so justly sensitive can
well be entirely avoided, and least so at periods of great political
excitement. An intelligent people, however, seldom fail to arrive in the
end at correct conclusions in such a matter. Practical economy in the
management of public affairs can have no adverse influence to contend
with more powerful than a large surplus revenue, and the unusually
large appropriations for 1837 may without doubt, independently of the
extraordinary requisitions for the public service growing out of the
state of our Indian relations, be in no inconsiderable degree traced
to this source. The sudden and rapid di