y feels that after M. Thiers "the
deluge," and he lives upon that feeling. A change of the President,
though legally simple, is in practice all but impossible; because all
know that such a change might be a change, not only of the President,
but of much more too: that very probably it might be a change of the
polity--that it might bring in a Monarchy or an Empire.

Lastly, by a natural consequence of the position, M. Thiers does not
govern as a Parliamentary Premier governs. He is not, he boasts that he
is not, the head of a party. On the contrary, being the one person
essential to all parties, he selects Ministers from all parties, he
constructs a Cabinet in which no one Minister agrees with any other in
anything, and with all the members of which he himself frequently
disagrees. The selection is quite in his hand. Ordinarily a
Parliamentary Premier cannot choose; he is brought in by a party; he is
maintained in office by a party; and that party requires that as they
aid him, he shall aid them; that as they give him the very best thing
in the State, he shall give them the next best things. But M. Thiers is
under no such restriction. He can choose as he likes, and does choose.
Neither in the selection of his Cabinet nor in the management of the
Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as a similar person in common
circumstances would have to be guided. He is the exception of a moment;
he is not the example of a lasting condition.

For these reasons, though we may use the present Constitution of France
as a useful aid to our imaginations, in conceiving of a purely
Parliamentary Republic, of a monarchy minus the monarch, we must not
think of it as much more. It is too singular in its nature and too
peculiar in its accidents to be a guide to anything except itself.

In this essay I made many remarks on the American Constitution, in
comparison with the English; and as to the American Constitution we
have had a whole world of experience since I first wrote. My great
object was to contrast the office of President as an executive officer
and to compare it with that of a Prime Minister; and I devoted much
space to showing that in one principal respect the English system is by
far the best. The English Premier being appointed by the selection, and
being removable at the pleasure, of the preponderant Legislative
Assembly, is sure to be able to rely on that Assembly. If he wants
legislation to aid his policy he can obtain that legislation;