ited Kingdom a "university"; she could dismiss most of the civil
servants; she could pardon all offenders. In a word, the Queen could by
prerogative upset all the action of civil government within the
Government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could,
by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless
against foreign nations. Why do we not fear that she would do this, or
any approach to it?

Because there are two checks--one ancient and coarse, the other modern
and delicate. The first is the check of impeachment. Any Minister who
advised the Queen so to use her prerogative as to endanger the safety
of the realm, might be impeached for high treason, and would be so.
Such a Minister would, in our technical law, be said to have levied, or
aided to levy, "war against the Queen". This counsel to her so to use
her prerogative would by the Judge be declared to be an act of violence
against herself, and in that peculiar but effectual way the offender
could be condemned and executed. Against all gross excesses of the
prerogative this is a sufficient protection. But it would be no
protection against minor mistakes; any error of judgment committed bona
fide, and only entailing consequences which one person might say were
good, and another say were bad, could not be so punished. It would be
possible to impeach any Minister who disbanded the Queen's army, and it
would be done for certain. But suppose a Minister were to reduce the
army or the navy much below the contemplated strength--suppose he were
only to spend upon them one-third of the amount which Parliament had
permitted him to spend--suppose a Minister of Lord Palmerston's
principles were suddenly and while in office converted to the
principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, and were to act on those
principles, he could not be impeached. The law of treason neither could
nor ought to be enforced against an act which was an error of judgment,
not of intention--which was in good faith intended not to impair the
well-being of the State, but to promote and augment it. Against such
misuses of the prerogative our remedy is a change of Ministry. And in
general this works very well. Every Minister looks long before he
incurs that penalty, and no one incurs it wantonly. But, nevertheless,
there are two defects in it. The first is that it may not be a remedy
at all; it may be only a punishment. A Minister may risk his dismissal;
he may do some act di