people think
best. An imposed government, a government like that of the English in
India, may very possibly be better; it may represent the views of a
higher race than the governed race; but it is not therefore a free
government. A free government is that which the people subject to it
voluntarily choose. In a casual collection of loose people the only
possible free government is a democratic government. Where no one
knows, or cares for, or respects any one else all must rank equal; no
one's opinion can be more potent than that of another. But, as has been
explained, a deferential nation has a structure of its own. Certain
persons are by common consent agreed to be wiser than others, and their
opinion is, by consent, to rank for much more than its numerical value.
We may in these happy nations weigh votes as well as count them, though
in less favoured countries we can count only. But in free nations, the
votes so weighed or so counted must decide. A perfect free government
is one which decides perfectly according to those votes; an imperfect,
one which so decides imperfectly; a bad, one which does not so decide
at all. Public opinion is the test of this polity; the best opinion
which with its existing habits of deference, the nation will accept: if
the free government goes by that opinion, it is a good government of
its species; if it contravenes that opinion, it is a bad one.

Tried by this rule the House of Commons does its appointing business
well. It chooses rulers as we wish rulers to be chosen. If it did not,
in a speaking and writing age we should soon know. I have heard a great
Liberal statesman say, "The time was coming when we must advertise for
a grievance".[6] What a good grievance it would be were the Ministry
appointed and retained by the Parliament a Ministry detested by the
nation. An anti-present-government league would be instantly created,
and it would be more instantly powerful and more instantly successful
than the Anti-Corn-Law League.

[6] This was said in 1858.

It has, indeed, been objected that the choosing business of Parliament
is done ill, because it does not choose strong Governments. And it is
certain that when public opinion does not definitely decide upon a
marked policy, and when in consequence parties in the Parliament are
nearly even, individual cupidity and changeability may make Parliament
change its appointees too often; may induce them never enough to trust
any of them; ma