himself, the more habituated he is to action in general,
the more sure he is to take and to value responsible counsel emanating
from ability and suggested by experience. That this principle brings
good fruit is certain. We have, by unequivocal admission, the best
budget in the world. Why should not the rest of our administration be
as good if we did but apply the same method to it?

I leave this to stand as it was originally written since it does not
profess to rest on my own knowledge, and only offers a suggestion on
good authority. Recent experience seems, however, to show that in all
great administrative departments there ought to be some one permanent
responsible head through whom the changing Parliamentary chief always
acts, from whom he learns everything, and to whom he communicates
everything. The daily work of the Exchequer is a trifle compared with
that of the Admiralty or the Home Office, and therefore a single
principal head is not there so necessary. But the preponderance of
evidence at present is that in all offices of very great work some one
such head is essential.

NO. VII.

ITS SUPPOSED CHECKS AND BALANCES.

In a former essay I devoted an elaborate discussion to the comparison
of the royal and unroyal form of Parliamentary government. I showed
that at the formation of a Ministry, and during the continuance of a
Ministry, a really sagacious monarch might be of rare use. I
ascertained that it was a mistake to fancy that at such times a
constitutional monarch had no rule and no duties. But I proved likewise
that the temper, the disposition, and the faculties then needful to fit
a constitutional monarch for usefulness were very rare, at least as
rare as the faculties of a great absolute monarch, and that a common
man in that place is apt to do at least as much harm as good--perhaps
more harm. But in that essay I could not discuss fully the functions of
a king at the conclusion of an administration, for then the most
peculiar parts of the English Government--the power to dissolve the
House of Commons, and the power to create new peers--come into play,
and until the nature of the House of Lords and the nature of the House
of Commons had been explained, I had no premises for an argument as to
the characteristic action of the king upon them. We have since
considered the functions of the two houses, and also the effects of
changes of Ministry on our administrative system; we are now,
therefore, in