el an antagonism of treatment.
In truth, the principal peculiarity of the House of Commons in
financial affairs is nowadays not a special privilege, but an
exceptional disability. On common subjects any member can propose
anything, but not on money--the Minister only can propose to tax the
people. This principle is commonly involved in mediaeval metaphysics as
to the prerogative of the Crown, but it is as useful in the nineteenth
century as in the fourteenth, and rests on as sure a principle. The
House of Commons--now that it is the true sovereign, and appoints the
real executive--has long ceased to be the checking, sparing, economical
body it once was. It now is more apt to spend money than the Minister
of the day. I have heard a very experienced financier say, "If you want
to raise a certain cheer in the House of Commons make a general
panegyric on economy; if you want to invite a sure defeat, propose a
particular saving". The process is simple. Every expenditure of public
money has some apparent public object; those who wish to spend the
money expatiate on that object; they say, "What is 50,000 pounds to
this great country? Is this a time for cheese-paring objection? Our
industry was never so productive; our resources never so immense. What
is 50,000 pounds in comparison with this great national interest?" The
members who are for the expenditure always come down; perhaps a
constituent or a friend who will profit by the outlay, or is keen on
the object, has asked them to attend; at any rate, there is a popular
vote to be given, on which the newspapers--always philanthropic, and
sometimes talked over--will be sure to make enconiums. The members
against the expenditure rarely come down of themselves; why should they
become unpopular without reason? The object seems decent; many of its
advocates are certainly sincere: a hostile vote will make enemies, and
be censured by the journals. If there were not some check, the
"people's house" would soon outrun the people's money. That check is
the responsibility of the Cabinet for the national finance. If any one
could propose a tax, they might let the House spend it as it would, and
wash their hands of the matter; but now, for whatever expenditure is
sanctioned--even when it is sanctioned against the Ministry's wish--the
Ministry must find the money. Accordingly, they have the strongest
motive to oppose extra outlay. They will have to pay the bill for it;
they will have to impo
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