effect being to postpone for a while the plaintiff's right
to sue; for example, the plea of an agreement not to sue for a certain
time, say, five years; for at the end of that time the plaintiff can
effectually pursue his remedy. Consequently persons who would like to
sue before the expiration of the time, but are prevented by the plea of
an agreement to the contrary, or something similar, ought to postpone
their action till the time specified has elapsed; and it is on this
account that such exceptions are called dilatory. If a plaintiff brought
his action before the time had expired, and was met by the exception,
this would debar him from all success in those proceedings, and formerly
he was unable to sue again, owing to his having rashly brought the
matter into court, whereby he consumed his right of action, and lost all
chance of recovering what was his due. Such unbending rules, however, we
do not at the present day approve. Plaintiffs who venture to commence
an action before the time agreed upon, or before the obligation is yet
actionable, we subject to the constitution of Zeno, which that most
sacred legislator enacted as to overclaims in respect of time; whereby,
if the plaintiff does not observe the stay which he has voluntarily
granted, or which is implied in the very nature of the action, the time
during which he ought to have postponed his action shall be doubled, and
at its termination the defendant shall not be suable until he has been
reimbursed for all expenses hitherto incurred. So heavy a penalty it is
hoped will induce plaintiffs in no case to sue until they are entitled.

11 Moreover, some personal incapacities produce dilatory exceptions,
such as those relating to agency, supposing that a party wishes to be
represented in an action by a soldier or a woman; for soldiers may not
act as attorneys in litigation even on behalf of such near relatives as
a father, mother, or wife, not even in virtue of an imperial rescript,
though they may attend to their own affairs without committing a breach
of discipline. We have sanctioned the abolition of those exceptions, by
which the appointment of an attorney was formerly opposed on account of
the infamy of either attorney or principal, because we found that they
no longer were met with in actual practice, and to prevent the trial of
the real issue being delayed by disputes as to their admissibility and
operation.

TITLE XIV. OF REPLICATIONS

Sometimes an