orce, or
clandestinely, or by permission, from his adversary.

5 A man's possession includes, besides his own personal possession, the
possession of any one who holds in his name, though not subject to his
power; for instance, his tenant. So also a depositary or borrower for
use may possess for him, as is expressed by the saying that we retain
possession by any one who holds in our name. Moreover, mere intention
suffices for the retention of possession; so that although a man is not
in actual possession either himself or through another, yet if it was
not with the intention of abandoning the thing that he left it, but with
that of subsequently returning to it, he is deemed not to have parted
with the possession. Through what persons we can obtain possession has
been explained in the second Book; and it is agreed on all hands that
for obtaining possession intention alone does not suffice.

6 An interdict for recovering possession is granted to persons who have
been forcibly ejected from land or buildings; their proper remedy being
the interdict 'Unde vi,' by which the ejector is compelled to restore
possession, even though it had been originally obtained from him by the
grantee of the interdict by force, clandestinely, or by permission.
But by imperial constitutions, as we have already observed, if a man
violently seizes on property to which he has a title, he forfeits his
right of ownership; if on property which belongs to some one else,
he has not only to restore it, but also to pay the person whom he has
violently dispossessed a sum of money equivalent to its value. In cases
of violent dispossession the wrongdoer is liable under the lex Iulia
relating to private or public violence, by the former being meant
unarmed force, by the latter dispossession effected with arms; and
the term 'arms' must be taken to include not only shields, swords, and
helmets, but also sticks and stones.

7 Thirdly, interdicts are divided into simple and double. Simple
interdicts are those wherein one party is plaintiff and the other
defendant, as is always the case in orders of restitution or production;
for he who demands restitution or production is plaintiff, and he from
whom it is demanded is defendant. Of interdicts which order abstention
some are simple, others double. The simple are exemplified by those
wherein the praetor commands the defendant to abstain from desecrating
consecrated ground, or from obstructing a public river or its