degrees under different
governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of eminence
called _free_. Such governments attain most completely the end which is
common to all government. A free constitution of government and a good
constitution of government are therefore different expressions for the
same idea.

Another material distinction, however, soon presents itself. In most
civilised states the subject is tolerably protected against gross
injustice from his fellows by impartial laws, which it is the manifest
interest of the sovereign to enforce. But some commonwealths are so
happy as to be founded on a principle of much more refined and provident
wisdom. The subjects of such commonwealths are guarded not only against
the injustice of each other, but (as far as human prudence can
contrive) against oppression from the magistrate. Such states, like all
other extraordinary examples of public or private excellence and
happiness, are thinly scattered over the different ages and countries of
the world. In them the will of the sovereign is limited with so exact a
measure, that his protecting authority is not weakened. Such a
combination of skill and fortune is not often to be expected, and indeed
never can arise, but from the constant though gradual exertions of
wisdom and virtue, to improve a long succession of most favourable
circumstances.

There is indeed scarce any society so wretched as to be destitute of
some sort of weak provision against the injustice of their governors.
Religious institutions, favourite prejudices, national manners, have in
different countries, with unequal degrees of force, checked or mitigated
the exercise of supreme power. The privileges of a powerful nobility, of
opulent mercantile communities, of great judicial corporations, have in
some monarchies approached more near to a control on the sovereign.
Means have been devised with more or less wisdom to temper the despotism
of an aristocracy over their subjects, and in democracies to protect the
minority against the majority, and the whole people against the tyranny
of demagogues. But in these unmixed forms of government, as the right of
legislation is vested in one individual or in one order, it is obvious
that the legislative power may shake off all the restraints which the
laws have imposed on it. All such governments, therefore, tend towards
despotism, and the securities which they admit against mis-government
are extremely fee