tain, no opinion
that is at variance with the whims and the caprices of his constituents.
This is the very _reductio ad absurdum_ of representative government.
That it is the dominant theory of the future there can be little doubt,
for it is of a piece with the progress downward which is the invariable
and unbroken tendency of republican institutions. It fits in well with
manhood suffrage, rotation in office, unrestricted patronage, assessment
of subordinates, an elective judiciary and the rest of it. This theory
of representative institutions is the last and lowest stage in our
pleasant performance of "shooting Niagara." When it shall have universal
recognition and assent we shall have been fairly engulfed in the
whirlpool, and the buzzard of anarchy may hopefully whet his beak for
the national carcass. My view of the matter--which has the further merit
of being the view held by those who founded this Government--is that a
man holding office from and for the people is in conscience and honor
bound to do what seems to his judgment best for the general welfare,
respectfully regardless of any and all other considerations. This is
especially true of legislators, to whom such specific "instructions" as
constituents sometimes send are an impertinence and an insult. Pushed to
its logical conclusion, the "delegate" idea would remove all necessity
of electing men of brains and judgment; one man properly connected
with his constituents by telegraph would make as good a legislator as
another. Indeed, as a matter of economy, one representative should act
for many constituencies, receiving his instructions how to vote from
mass meetings in each. This, besides being logical, would have the added
advantage of widening and hardening the power of the local "bosses,"
who, by properly managing the showing of hands could have the same
beneficent influence in national affairs that they now enjoy in
municipal. The plan would be a pretty good one if there were not so many
other ways for the Nation to go to the Devil that it appears needless.

VIII.

With a wiser wisdom than was given to them, our forefathers in making
the Constitution would not have provided that each House of Congress
"shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its own members." They would have foreseen that a ruling majority of
Congress could not safely be trusted to exercise this power justly in
the public interest, but would abuse it in the