l, but when he seeks counsel. It would
be better for the community if he could not obtain the services of a
reputable attorney, or any attorney at all. A defense that can not be
made without his attorney's actual knowledge of his guilt should be
impossible to him. Nor should he be permitted to remain off the witness
stand lest he incriminate himself. It ought to be the aim of the court
to let him incriminate himself--to make him do so if his testimony
will. In our courts that natural method would serve the ends of justice
greatly better than the one that we have. Testimony of the guilty would
assist in conviction; that of the innocent would not.

As to the general question of a judge's right to inflict arbitrary
punishment for words that he may be pleased to hold disrespectful to
himself or another judge, I do not myself believe that any such right
exists; the practice seems to be merely a survival--a heritage from the
dark days of irresponsible power, when the scope of judicial authority
had no other bounds than fear of the royal gout or indigestion. If in
these modern days the same right is to exist it may be necessary to
revive the old checks upon it by restoring the throne. In freeing us
from the monarchial chain, the coalition of European Powers commonly
known in American history as "the valor of our forefathers" stripped us
starker than they knew.

Suppose an attorney should find his client's interests imperiled by
a prejudiced or corrupt judge--what is he to do? If he may not make
representations to that effect, supporting them with evidence, where
evidence is possible and by inference where it is not, what means of
protection shall he venture to adopt? If it be urged in objection that
judges are never prejudiced nor corrupt I confess that I shall have no
answer: the proposition will deprive me of breath.

If contempt is not a crime it should not be punished; if a crime it
should be punished as other crimes are punished--by indictment
or information, trial by jury if a jury is demanded, with all the
safeguards that secure an accused person against judicial blunders and
judicial bias. The necessity for these safeguards is even greater
in cases of contempt than in others--particularly if the prosecuting
witness is to sit in judgment on his own grievance. That should, of
course, not be permitted: the trial should take place before another
judge.

Why should twelve able-bodied jurymen, with their oaths to guide t