are allowed by
Jesus Christ?"

"If in former trials you have obstructed justice by slander of the
dead, by falsely affirming the innocence of the guilty, by cheating in
argument, by deceiving the court whom you are sworn to serve and assist,
and have done all this for personal gain, do you expect, and is it
reasonable for you to expect, the jury in this case to believe you?"

"One moment more, please. Did you ever accept an annual, or other fee
conditioned on your not taking any action against a corporation?"

"While in receipt of such refrainer--I beg you pardon, retainer--did you
ever prosecute a blackmailer?"

It will be seen that in testing the credibility of a lawyer it is
needless to go into his private life and his character as a man and
a citizen: his professional practices are an ample field in which to
search for offenses against man and God. Indeed, it is sufficient simply
to ask him: "What is your view of 'the ethics of your profession' as a
suitable standard of conduct for a pirate of the Spanish Main?"

The moral sense of the laymen is dimly conscious of something wrong
in the ethics of the noble profession; the lawyers affirming, rightly
enough, a public necessity for them and their mercenary services, permit
their thrift to construe it vaguely as personal justification. But
nobody has blown away from the matter its brumous encompassment and let
in the light upon it It is very simple.

Is it honorable for a lawyer to try to clear a man that he knows
deserves conviction? That is not the entire question by much. Is it
honorable to pretend to believe what you do not believe? Is it honorable
to lie? I submit that these questions are not answered affirmatively by
showing the disadvantage to the public and to civilization of a lawyer
refusing to serve a known offender. The popular interest, like any other
good cause, can be and commonly is, served by foul means. Justice itself
may be promoted by acts essentially unjust. In serving a sordid ambition
a powerful scoundrel may by acts in themselves wicked augment the
prosperity of a whole nation. I have not the right to deceive and lie in
order to advantage my fellowmen, any more than I have the right to steal
or murder to advantage them, nor have my fellowmen the power to grant me
that indulgence.

The question of a lawyer's right to clear a known criminal (with the
several questions involved) is not answered affirmatively by showing
that the law forbids