nticipated serious resistance on the religious question, even
though the King, at the time of the Fitzwilliam crisis of 1795, had
declared the admission of Catholics to the Irish Parliament to be a
matter which concerned his conscience, not his Cabinet.

It is also obvious that the question of the Union was forced to the
front by the cumbrous dualism of the Irish Executive, which proved to be
utterly unable to cope with the crisis of the Rebellion. The King, as we
have seen, shrewdly suggested that Cornwallis ought to make use of the
fears of Irish loyalists in order to frighten the Dublin Parliament into
acquiescence in an Act of Union. The same opinion was gaining ground;
but several of Pitt's supporters doubted the advisability of so
far-reaching a measure. Thus, on 4th July 1798, Hatsell, Clerk of the
House of Commons, wrote to Auckland that of all possible plans a Union
was the worst, "full of difficulties, to be brought about by errant
jobs; and, when done, not answering the purpose. You must take out the
teeth, or give the Catholics sops to eat. One or other; but the
half-measure won't do." Better balanced was the judgement of the Earl of
Carlisle, as stated to Auckland some time in September. After asking
whether the recurrence of local risings in Ireland did not prove the
unwisdom of the policy of lenience pursued by Cornwallis, he added these
significant words: "In this distress it is not strange that we should
turn to the expedient of Union; but this is running in a dark night for
a port we are little acquainted with.... If you did not satisfy Ireland
by the measure and take off some part of those ill-disposed to England,
you would only make matters worse. But in truth something must be done,
or we must fight for Ireland once a week."[535]

That the activity of the rebels varied according to the prospects of aid
from France was manifest. Thus, on 25th July Beresford wrote to Auckland
that the people seemed tired of rebellion, which would die out unless
the French landed. But on 22nd August, after the arrival of Humbert's
little force in Killala Bay, he described the whole country as in
revolt. The State prisoners, O'Connor, McNevin, and Addis Emmett, sent
to the papers a denial of their former pacific assurances;[536] and
even after the surrender of Humbert's force, Beresford wrote to Auckland
on 15th September: "... Should the French or the Dutch get out an
armament and land, there will be a very general ris