orite
theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. The futility of such
declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the
superiority of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still
it may be truly said that the winter spent at Capua (B.C. 216-215) was
in great measure the turning-point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this
time the war assumed an altered character. The experiment of what he
could effect with his single army had now been fully tried, and,
notwithstanding all his victories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was
still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a
protracted contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone,
and he now found himself, apparently at least, in a condition to
commence the execution of his long-cherished plan--that of arming Italy
itself against the Romans, and crushing the ruling power by means of her
own subjects. It was to this object that his attention was henceforth
mainly directed. From this time, also, the Romans changed their plan of
operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great army in the
field, they hemmed in his movements on all sides, guarded all the most
important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every
province of Italy to thwart the operations of his lieutenants and check
the rising disposition to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in
detail the complicated operations of the subsequent campaigns, during
which Hannibal himself frequently traversed Italy in all directions,
appearing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, and astonishing
and often baffling the enemy by the rapidity of his marches. All that we
can do is to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished
each successive campaign.

The campaign of B.C. 215 was not marked by any decisive events. The
Consuls were Q. Fabius Maximus (whose plan of conducting the war had
been fully vindicated by the terrible defeat of Cannae) and Tiberius
Sempronius Gracchus. With the advance of spring Hannibal took up his
camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of
re-enforcements from Carthage, he was at hand to support his partisans
in Campania and oppose the Roman generals in that province. But his
attempts on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled, and even after he had been
joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior, however, to what he had
expected), he sustained a repulse before Nola, which was m