e United States."

But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_.
That part of the District therefore, which includes the cities of
Washington and Georgetown, can lay claim to nothing with which to ward
off the power of Congress. The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2.
Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in
the United States any right of property in the _soil_, or to affect the
rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be
transferred by such individuals to the United States."

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and
explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute
right._" Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and
other subjects, it even gives it wider scope; for exceptions to _parts_
of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the
exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict
congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil
alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in
words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling
his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that
slavery was _meant_, though nothing was _said_ about it? The subject
must have been too "delicate," even for the most distant allusion! The
mystery of silence is solved!!

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them
to be "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives to
Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over" the ten
miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States
gave an express and decided confirmation of it. Now, their acts of
cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they
conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions
was a violation of the constitution. If they accorded, the objector has
already had his answer. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions,
proves that in its view their _terms_ did not conflict with the
constitutional grant of "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever over such District." The inquiry whether these acts of
cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United States
constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What saith
the CONSTITUTION? That is the question. Not, what sai