tates. 3d. Not to abolish any _form_ or _appendage_ of
it still existing in those states. 4th. _To abolish_ when they do. 5th.
To increase or abate its rigor _when, how_, and _as_ the same are
modified by those states. In a word, Congressional action in the
District is to float passively in the wake of legislative action on the
subject in those states.

But here comes a dilemma. Suppose the legislation of those states should
steer different courses--then there would be _two_ wakes! Can Congress
float in both? Yea, verily! Nothing is too hard for it! Its
obsequiousness equals its "power of legislation in _all_ cases
whatsoever." It can float _up_ on the Virginia tide, and ebb down on the
Maryland at the same time. What Maryland does, Congress will do in the
Maryland part. What Virginia does, Congress will do in the Virginia
part. Though Congress might not always be able to run at the bidding of
both _at once_, especially in different directions, yet if it obeyed
orders cheerfully, and "kept in its place," according to its "good faith
implied," impossibilities might not be rigidly exacted. True, we have
the highest sanction for the maxim that no _man_ can serve two
masters--but if "corporations have _no_ souls," analogy would absolve
Congress on that score, or at most give it only _a very small soul_--not
large enough to be at all in the way, as an _exception_ to the universal
rule laid down to the maxim!

In following out the absurdities of this "_implied_ good faith," it will
be seen at once that the doctrine of Mr. Clay's Resolution extends to
_all the subjects_ of _legislation_ existing in Maryland and Virginia,
which exist also within the District. Every system, "institution," law,
and established usage there, is placed beyond Congressional control
equally with slavery, and by the same "implied faith." The abolition of
the lottery system in the District as an _immorality_, was a flagrant
breach of this "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, as the system
"still continued in those states." So to abolish imprisonment for debt,
and capital punishment, to remodel the bank system, the power of
corporations, the militia law, laws of limitation, &c., in the District,
_unless Virginia and Maryland took the lead_, would violate the "good
faith implied in the cession," &c.

That in the acts of cession no such "good faith" was "implied by
Virginia and Maryland" as is claimed in the Resolution, we argue from
the fact, that in