ion _knows_ them only as
"persons," and _will_ not recognise them in any other light. If they
escape into free States, the constitution authorizes their being taken
back. But how? Not as the property of an "owner," but as "persons;" and
the peculiarity of the expression is a marked recognition of their
_personality_--a refusal to recognise them as chattels--"persons _held_
to service." Are _oxen "held_ to service?" That can be affirmed only of
_persons_. Again, slaves give political power as "persons." The
constitution, in settling the principle of representation, requires
their enumeration in the census. How? As property? Then why not include
race horses and game cocks? Slaves, like other inhabitants, are
enumerated as "persons." So by the constitution, the government was
pledged to non-interference with "the migration or importation of such
_persons_" as the States might think proper to admit until 1808, and
authorized the laying of a tax on each "person" so admitted. Further,
slaves are recognized as "persons" by the exaction of their _allegiance_
to the government. For offences against the government slaves are tried
as _persons_; as persons they are entitled to counsel for their defence,
to the rules of evidence, and to "due process of the law," and as
_persons_ they are punished. True, they are loaded with cruel
disabilities in courts of law, such as greatly obstruct and often
inevitably defeat the ends of justice, yet they are still recognised as
_persons_. Even in the legislation of Congress, and in the diplomacy of
the general government, notwithstanding the frequent and wide departures
from the integrity of the constitution on this subject, slaves are not
recognised as _property_ without qualification. Congress has always
refused to grant compensation for slaves killed or taken by the enemy,
even when these slaves had been impressed into the United States'
service. In half a score of cases since the last war, Congress has
rejected such applications for compensation. Besides, both in
Congressional acts, and in our national diplomacy, slaves and property
are not used as convertible terms. When mentioned in treaties and state
papers it is in such a way as to distinguish them from mere property,
and generally by a recognition of their _personality_. In the invariable
recognition of slaves as _persons_, the United States' constitution
caught the mantle of the glorious Declaration, and most worthily wears
it.--It rec