y which Congress is
restrained from making any law abridging "the right of the People,
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Had it not been for this prudent jealousy of our Fathers,
instead of the resolution I have transcribed, we should have had a LAW,
visiting with pains and penalties, all who dared to petition the Federal
Government, in behalf of the victims of oppression, held in bondage by
its authority. The present resolution cannot indeed consign such
petitioners to the prison or the scaffold, but it makes the right to
petition a congressional boon, to be granted or withheld at pleasure,
and in the present case effectually withholds it, by tendering it
nugatory.

Petitions are to inform the Government of the wishes of the people, and
by calling forth the action of the Legislature, to inform the
constituents how far their wishes are respected by their
representatives. The information thus mutually given and received is
essential to a faithful and enlightened exercise of the right of
legislation on the one hand, and of suffrage on the other. But the
resolution we are considering, provides that no petition in relation to
slavery, shall be printed for the information of the members, nor
referred to a committee to ascertain the truth of its statements; nor
shall any vote be taken, in regard to it, by which the People may learn
the sentiments of their representatives.

If Congress may thus dispose of petitions on one subject, they may make
the same disposition of petitions on any and every other subject. Our
representatives are bound by oath, not to pass any law abridging the
right of petition, but if this resolution is constitutional, they may
order every petition to be delivered to their door-keeper, and by him to
be committed to the flames; for why preserve petitions on which _no
action can be had_? Had the resolution been directed to petitions for an
object palpably unconstitutional, it would still have been without
excuse. The construction of the Constitution is a matter of opinion, and
every citizen has a right to express that opinion in a petition, or
otherwise.

But this usurpation is aggravated by the almost universal admission that
Congress does possess the constitutional power to legislate on the
subject of slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories. No
wonder that a distinguished statesman refused to sanction the right of
the House to pass such