e get a thing as presented by it we call it right
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthadhigati_).
The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual
presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it
(_arthadhigamat samapta@h prama@navyaparah_). Thus there are
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:
(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections
and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation
is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly
through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed
in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived
at the moment of perception was not the same as that
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series
(_niladau ya eva santana@h paricchinno nilajnanena sa eva tena
prapita@h tena nilajnanam prama@nam_) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent
of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

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[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of
_Nyayaybindu_, Vinitadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in
_Nyayabindu@tikatippani_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutika_ of Dharmmottara,
but their te