not but do it. Thus all
affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are
thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four
again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that
the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and
is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.
Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its
nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of
them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngi_
holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each
from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

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[Footnote 1: See _Syadvadamanjari_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166,
etc.]

181

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional,
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or
senses (_upadhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent
and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite,
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation,
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of
the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this,
that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as
many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya,
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely
according to any particular naya without any reference to
other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgments are false and