FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199  
200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   >>   >|  
caya_ (not available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnaga (500 A.D.) was "_Kalpanapodham_." According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa jnana_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (_savikalpa jnana_), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.] 154 to the sense (_purvad@r@s@taparad@r@s@tancarthamekikurvadvijnanamasannihitavi@sayam purvad@r@s@tasyasannihitatvat_). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (_arthena saha yatsarupyam sad@rs'yamasya jnanasya tatprama@namiha_). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi sarupyam tasya vas'at_) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (_vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena_). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h kincidrupam prama@nam kincitprama@naphalam na virudhyate_). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness (_vyavasthapanaheturhi sarupyam_), so that by the determinate we know the determinant
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199  
200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

object

 

perception

 

similarity

 
presented
 

senses

 
percept
 

awareness

 

determinate

 

determinant

 
knowledge

indefinite

 

sarupyam

 

sameness

 

purvad

 

similar

 

cognition

 

presentation

 
tatprama
 
namiha
 
jnanasya

taditi

 

appears

 
invalid
 

external

 

objection

 

virtue

 

kincidrupam

 
kincitprama
 

vastuna

 

ekasya


naphalam

 

vyavasthapanaheturhi

 

definite

 

virudhyate

 

account

 

signifying

 

stands

 
perceived
 

blueness

 
relation

vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena

 

causation

 

yamasya

 

notion

 

identifying

 

experienced

 

activity

 

savikalpa

 

formed

 

conceptual