him. To the
painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his
companions in arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the
burning of our fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event
at a single glance. We were now cut off from all communication with
France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading
capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. Bonaparte had lost all
chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter
reflection. And at what a time did this disaster befall him? At the
very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the
mother-country.

From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of
August, his object was, having once secured the possession of Egypt; to
return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of
every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces
that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the
purpose of attacking England. It is certain that previously to his
departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to
his plans. He always regarded a descent upon England as possible, though
in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in naval strength;
but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a superiority on one point.

His intention was to return to France. Availing himself of the departure
of the English fleet for the Mediterranean, the alarm excited by his
Egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden
appearance at Boulogne, and his preparations against England, he hoped to
oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the Mediterranean, and
to prevent her sending out troops to Egypt. This project was often in
his head. He would have thought it sublime to date an order of the day
from the ruins of Memphis, and three months later, one from London. The
loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions into mere romantic
visions.

When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. I observed to him
that the disaster was doubtless great, but that it would have been
infinitely more irreparable had Nelson fallen in with us at Malta, or had
he waited for us four-and-twenty hours before Alexandria, or in the open
sea. "Any one of these events," said I, "which were not only possible
but probable, would have deprived us of every resource. We are blockaded
here, but we have provisions