though it is that which here most nearly
concerns us, was perhaps the least important. Since Congress was
manifestly unable to carry out the treaty, an excuse was furnished to
England for declining to fulfil some of its provisions. In regard to the
loyalists, indeed, the treaty had recognized that Congress possessed but
an advisory power; but in the other provision concerning the payment of
private debts, which in the popular mind was very much mixed up with the
question of justice to the loyalists, the faith of the United States was
distinctly pledged. On this point also Congress was powerless to enforce
the treaty. Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
and South Carolina had all enacted laws obstructing the collection of
British debts; and in flat defiance of the treaty these statutes
remained in force until after the downfall of the Confederation. The
states were aware that such conduct needed an excuse, and one was soon
forthcoming. Many negroes had left the country with the British fleet:
some doubtless had sought their freedom; others, perhaps, had been
kidnapped as booty, and sold to planters in the West Indies. The number
of these black men carried away by the fleet had been magnified tenfold
by popular rumour. Complaints had been made to Sir Guy Carleton, but he
had replied that any negro who came within his lines was presumably a
freeman, and he could not lend his aid in remanding such persons to
slavery. Jay, as one of the treaty commissioners, gave it as his opinion
that Carleton was quite right in this, but he thought that where a loss
of slaves could be proved, Great Britain was bound to make pecuniary
compensation to the owners. The matter was wrangled over for several
years, in the state legislatures, in town and county meetings, at
dinner-tables, and in bar-rooms, with the general result that, until
such compensation should be made, the statutes hindering the collection
of debts would not be repealed. In retaliation for this, Great Britain
refused to withdraw her garrisons from the western fortresses, which the
treaty had surrendered to the United States. This measure was very
keenly felt by the people. As an assertion of superior strength, it was
peculiarly galling to our weak and divided confederacy, and it also
wrought us direct practical injury. It encouraged the Indian tribes in
their depredations on the frontier, and it deprived American merchants
of an immensely lucrative trade