nd the obstacles so much the
more diminished. In short, to him, the gain of time was every thing.
His own narrative on the subject now was, that he had been misled; that
he was fully sensible of the advantages of delay, but that accident had
betrayed him. He had established a secret correspondence with Vienna,
through which he received weekly accounts of all that had passed in
Congress, and was prepared to act accordingly. One of his agents, De
Chaboulon, arrived at Elba, at the same period with the Chevalier
D'Istria, (whom the King of Naples had sent with the despatch received
from his ambassador at Vienna,) announcing the closing of the Congress,
and the departure of the Emperor Alexander. On this intelligence
Napoleon determined immediately to set sail for France, without waiting
for the return of Cipriani, whom he had sent on a special mission. Had
he waited for that return, the Emperor Alexander would have been on his
way to Russia. But the result of his precipitancy was, that by rushing
into France, while the emperors and diplomatists were still in
combination, they were enabled to level the blow at him immediately.
Instead of negotiations, he was pursued with a hue and cry; and instead
of being treated as a prince, he was proclaimed an outlaw. Cipriani
arrived in Elba on the 27th of February, but Napoleon had sailed on the
evening of the 26th. So delicate was the interval between total ruin and
what might have been final security; for Cipriani brought news of the
Congress, and despatches from Vienna, which would have proved the
importance of delaying the departure of the expedition.
But it must now be acknowledged that, if there ever was a human being
under the influence of infatuation, that being was Napoleon, in the
latter stages of his career. For ten years the favourite of fortune, the
long arrear had begun to be paid in the year 1812. His expedition to
Moscow was less a blunder than a frenzy. There was, perhaps, not one man
in a thousand in Europe but foresaw the almost inevitable ruin of his
army. We can recollect the rejoicing with which this perilous advance
was viewed in England, and the universal prediction that the Russian
deserts would be the grave of his army, if not of his empire. Poland had
been conquered in a march and a month. The residence of Napoleon at
Warsaw for the winter would have raised a Polish army for him, and would
have given him a year for the march to Moscow. But he was _infatuat
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