ing short, Spaniards and Italians were suffering
from the cold rains of the Danube valley. The papal contingent was
demoralized for want of pay; three thousand men deserted in a day,
whereas the Lutherans were reenforced. Yet Charles, in spite of
professional advice, refused to go into winter quarters. He counted on
divisions in the League, on the selfish interests of the towns, on the
penury of the princes, and reckoned aright. The fighting was never more
than skirmishing; not arms but ducats were deciding the issue; the fate
of war was literally hanging on a fortnight's pay.

The Emperor had said that a league between towns and princes could never
last. The financial burden pressed mainly on the cities, and they
refused to raise further subsidies. The richer classes had always
disliked the war; the great merchants were often, as the Fuggers of
Augsburg, zealous Catholics. Trade was at a standstill, and they could
protest that all their capital was at the Emperor's mercy, at Antwerp,
at Seville, in the Indies, or else in Portugal. It was convenient to
forget the brisk traffic which still continued with friendly Lyons. Zeal
for the Lutheran cause seemed limited to a Catholic, Piero Strozzi the
Florentine exile, who in his hatred for the Hapsburgs was vainly
spending his fortune on revenge, striving for aid from Venice,
negotiating loans from France. There was, moreover, no real solidarity
between Northern and Southern Germany. Neither the Protestant princes
nor the wealthy cities of the Baltic had as yet stirred a finger for the
cause. Under any circumstances the Lutheran army must have broken up.
The leaders had resolved to retire to the Rhineland for the winter, live
at free quarters on the ecclesiastical princes, and renew the struggle
in the spring.

At this critical moment Maurice of Saxony came into action. Hitherto his
conduct had been ambiguous. This was probably due less to deliberate
deceit than to genuine hesitation. The incompetence of the Lutheran
leaders and Ferdinand's expressed intention of invading Ernestine Saxony
determined him. Persuading his estates with difficulty that it was
necessary to save the Electorate for the house of Wettin, he undertook
to execute the ban in his cousin's state. His reward was the title of
elector and the Ernestine territories. The correspondence of Charles and
his brother on the subject was characteristic of both. Ferdinand, always
greedy of territory, had bargained for p