discussion--the
liberty of the press--the right to make known opinions upon any subject,
and to produce arguments in support of them. In this country, it may be
supposed to be wholly unnecessary to investigate this subject, inasmuch
as the liberty of the press is here maintained to the most unlimited
extent. So far as the mere legal right is involved, this is undoubtedly
true; the established laws interpose no impediment to the expression and
publication of opinions, except those indispensable regulations which
are intended to preserve the public peace and morality, and to protect
private character from wanton injury. We have no reason to fear any
invasion of the liberty of the press--any political interference with
the right of free discussion--unless in times of great public danger,
or, as Mr. Mill says, 'during some temporary panic, when fear of
insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety.' But
there is a despotism of society, in this country as well as elsewhere,
which, independent of law or authority, often imposes silence on
unpopular opinions, and suppresses all discussion, by means of those ten
thousand appliances and expedients adopted by communities to express
displeasure and to command obedience. Even, however, if there were not
the slightest evidence of intolerance in the country, if the rational
principles of liberty were universally acknowledged and practised upon,
it would still be most useful and interesting to follow this author in
his admirable discussion of the subject. It would be a matter of no
little importance to understand the rational grounds on which the great
and acknowledged principles of liberty are actually founded, and to see
the perfect frankness and fearlessness with which this philosophic
author follows the doctrine to its extreme but inevitable conclusions.
For instance, Mr. Mill does not hesitate to say, 'if all mankind minus
one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one
person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind.' And this position is maintained not solely or chiefly on the
ground of injustice to the person holding the obnoxious opinion, but
because the forcible suppression of it would do even greater injustice
to those who conscientiously reject it. For if the opinion be true, its
establishment and dissemination would benefit mankind; and even if