FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31  
32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   >>   >|  
mprobable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts believe that the failure of at least one dam should be anticipated during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San Francisco regions. Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory. Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must be anticipated. The redundancy of existing communication systems, including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability for communicating with the affected region from the outside would almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and management actions; however, total restoration of service would take significantly longer. While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the operational integration of communications systems and networks among the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies. Because of their network-like character, most systems for transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a whole, are r
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31  
32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

emergency

 
earthquake
 

service

 
systems
 

communication

 

agencies

 

earthquakes

 

capability

 

commercial

 

anticipated


problem

 

telephone

 
including
 

damage

 

demand

 

Federal

 
failure
 

Fernando

 
California
 

reduce


affected
 

management

 

actions

 

existing

 

result

 

maintenance

 

redundancy

 

designed

 

Restoration

 

region


surely

 

restoration

 

carriers

 
communicating
 
minimal
 

communications

 

networks

 
relevant
 

Because

 

integration


operational

 

Consequently

 

resolution

 

network

 

generation

 
distribution
 

transportation

 
character
 

government

 

telephonic