manent gain was effected by these
successes. A weakness inherited by the Persians from the Parthians--an
inability to conduct sieges to a prosperous issue--showed itself; and
their failures against the fortified posts which Rome had taken care
to establish in the disputed regions were continual. Up to the close of
A.D. 340 Sapor had made no important gain, had struck no decisive blow,
but stood nearly in the same position which he had occupied at the
commencement of the conflict.

But the year A.D. 341 saw a change. Sapor, after obtaining possession of
the person of Tiranus, had sought to make himself master of Armenia, and
had even attempted to set up one of his own relatives as king. But the
indomitable spirit of the inhabitants, and their firm attachment to
their Arsacid princes, caused his attempts to fail of any good result,
and tended on the whole to throw Armenia into the arms of Rome. Sapor,
after a while, became convinced of the folly of his proceedings, and
resolved on the adoption of a wholly new policy. He would relinquish
the idea of conquering, and would endeavor instead to conciliate the
Armenians, in the hope of obtaining from their gratitude what he had
been unable to extort from their fears. Tiranus was still living; and
Sapor, we are told, offered to replace him upon the Armenian throne;
but, as he had been blinded by his captors, and as Oriental notions
did not allow a person thus mutilated to exercise royal power, Tiranus
declined the offer made him, and suggested the substitution of his son,
Arsaces, who was, like himself, a prisoner in Persia. Sapor readily
consented; and the young prince, released from captivity, returned
to his country, and was installed as king by the Persians, with the
good-will of the natives, who were satisfied so long as they could
feel that they had at their head a monarch of the ancient stock. The
arrangement, of course, placed Armenia on the Persian side, and gave
Sapor for many years a powerful ally in his struggle with Rome.

Thus Sapor had, by the, year A.D. 341, made a very considerable gain. He
had placed a friendly sovereign on the Armenian throne, had bound him to
his cause by oaths, and had thereby established his influence, not only
over Armenia itself, but over the whole tract which lay between Armenia
and the Caucasus. But he was far from content with these successes. It
was still his great object to drive the Romans from Mesopotamia; and
with that object in