es were given and received on either side, to be
retained until the stipulations of the treaty were executed.
The Roman historian who exclaims that it would have been better to have
fought ten battles than to have conceded a single one of these shameful
terms, commands the sympathy of every reader, who cannot fail to
recognize in his utterance the natural feeling of a patriot. And it is
possible that Julian, had he lived, would have rejected so inglorious a
peace, and have preferred to run all risks rather than sign it. But in
that case there is every reason to believe that the army would have been
absolutely destroyed, and a few stragglers only have returned to tell
the tale of disaster. The alternative which Ammianus suggests--that
Jovian, instead of negotiating, should have pushed on to Cordyene, which
he might have reached in four days--is absurd; for Cordyeno was at least
a hundred and fifty miles distant from Dura, and, at the rate of retreat
which Jovian had found possible (four and a half miles a day), would
have been reached in three days over a month! The judgment of Eutropius,
who, like Ammianus, shared in the expedition, is probably correct--that
the peace, though disgraceful, was necessary. Unless Jovian was prepared
to risk not only his own life, but the lives of all his soldiers, it was
essential that he should come to terms; and the best terms that he could
obtain were those which he has been blamed for accepting.
It is creditable to both parties that the peace, once made, was
faithfully observed, all its stipulations being honestly and speedily
executed. The Romans were allowed to pass the river without molestation
from Sapor's army, and, though they suffered somewhat from the Saracens
when landing on the other side, were unpursued in their retreat, and
were perhaps even, at first, supplied to some extent with provisions.
Afterwards, no doubt, they endured for some days great privations; but
a convoy with stores was allowed to advance from Roman Mesopotamia into
Persian territory, which met the famished soldiers at a Persian military
post, called Ur or Adur, and relieved their most pressing necessities.
On the Roman side, the ceded provinces and towns were quietly
surrendered; offers on the part of the inhabitants to hold their own
against the Persians without Roman aid were refused; the Roman troops
were withdrawn from the fortresses; and the Armenians were told that
they must henceforth rely upon th
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