ieged destroyed the
Roman works. At last the rainy season set in, and the low ground
outside the town became a glutinous and adhesive marsh. It was no longer
possible to continue the siege; and the disappointed emperor reluctantly
drew off his troops, recrossed the Euphrates, and retired into winter
quarters at Antioch.

The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of A.D. 359 and 360, his
captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with the unfortunate
issue of the expedition made by Constantius against the last-named
place, had a tendency to shake the fidelity of the Roman vassal-kings,
Arsaces of Armenia, and Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore,
during the winter of A.D. 360-1, which he passed at Antioch, sent
emissaries to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavored to secure
their fidelity by loading them with costly presents. His policy seems to
have been so far successful that no revolt of these kingdoms took place;
they did not as yet desert the Romans or make their submission to Sapor.
Their monarchs seem to have simply watched events, prepared to declare
themselves distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should
incline unmistakably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they
maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome.

It might have been expected that the year A.D. 361 would have been a
turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did not by a great effort
assert herself and recover her prestige, the advance of Persia would
have been marked and rapid. But the actual course of events was far
different. Hesitation and diffidence characterize the movements of
both parties to the contest, and the year is signalized by no important
enterprise on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied Edessa,
and had (we are told) some thoughts of renewing the siege of Bezabde;
actually, however, he did not advance further, but contented himself
with sending a part of his army to watch Sapor, giving them strict
orders not to risk an engagement. Sapor, on his side, began the year
with demonstrations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass
the Euphrates; but in reality he never even brought his troops across
the Tigris, or once set foot in Mesopotamia. After wasting weeks or
months in a futile display of his armed strength upon the eastern bank
of the river, and violently alarming the officers sent by Constantius to
observe his movements, he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew