ch Ireland has offered in this grave hour. They hope to announce as
soon as possible arrangements by which this offer can be made use of to
the fullest possible extent."
That unquestionably represented the mind of Mr. Asquith and his civilian
colleagues. But a new power had transformed the Cabinet. Lord Kitchener,
refusing to accept the post of Commander in Chief, had insisted on
becoming Secretary of State for War.
No one is likely to underestimate Lord Kitchener's value at that hour.
But probably no one now will dispute that the political control which
this soldier obtained was excessive and was dangerous. Years of fierce
faction had shaken the public confidence in politicians, and a soldier
was traditionally above and beyond politics. But in Lord Kitchener's
case the soldier was certainly remote from and below the regions of
statesmanship. Narrow, domineering, and obstinate, he was a difficult
colleague for anyone; and for a Prime Minister with so easy a temper as
Mr. Asquith he was not a colleague but a master. He claimed to be
supreme in all matters relating to the Army, and in such a war this came
near to covering the whole field of government. It most certainly
covered the question of dealing with the Irish Volunteers and with the
Ulster Volunteers, which meant in reality the whole question of
Ireland.
Immediately on Lord Kitchener's appointment Redmond had an interview
with him. Redmond's report was that he had been most friendly--and most
limited in his expectations. "Get me five thousand men, and I will say
'Thank you,'" he had said. "Get me ten thousand, and I will take off my
hat to you." Yet the very smallness of the estimate should have been a
note of warning to us; it indicated a cynical view of Ireland's response
to Redmond's public declaration.
On the question of the Volunteers he made friendly promises. As the
Sirdar in Egypt he had been used to giving fair words to native chiefs.
There is not the least reason to suppose that Lord Kitchener would have
felt bound to show Redmond his real mind.
The truth was that Lord Kitchener held in respect to Ireland the
traditional opinions of the British Army. Nobody could blame the
professional soldier for dislike and distrust of Irish Nationalist
politicians generally; but when at such a crisis a professional soldier,
by no means conspicuous for breadth of mind, came to hold such a
position as Lord Kitchener seized, the result was certain to be
disastr
|